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The Agonistic Struggle between
Trinamool Congress and a Non-
partisan Protest Alliance: West





1 The main purpose of  this  article1 is  to provide a linear and layered account of  the
movement  against  the  NRC,  CAB/CAA,  and  NPR  in  Kolkata  and  West  Bengal.2 In
particular, it retraces the ways in which a non-partisan alliance of Muslim and non-
parliamentary left organizations initially spearheaded this movement and managed to
impose  their  key  demands  on  the  West  Bengal  government  under  the  Trinamool
Congress (TMC) party—in spite of the movement being taken over by the latter. While
this  article  does  not  aim  to  make  a  contribution  to  anthropological  theoretical
concerns,  the  analytical  theme  organizing  what  is  otherwise  a  largely  descriptive,
chronological, and synoptic account is anchored in a two-fold argument. Firstly, it is to
foreground  how  a  moral  community,  in  fact  a  citizenry  of  sorts,  emerged  in  an
imagined but morally compelling sense, which in turn exercised symbolic pressure on
other opposition forces including the opposition party governing the federal state. The
movement’s production of publics and their subsequent integration, both symbolic and
mobilizational, was successful in creating a moral unity and community which, even if
largely imaginary,  was nonetheless imagined jointly by otherwise agonistic political
actors. This leads onto the second aspect of my argument, namely that this unity at a
symbolic level was achieved in spite of—and then precisely through—the fact that the
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movement’s leaders were politically fractured and pursued disparate goals under the
same banner. 
 
Political background to the agitations in West Bengal
2 The agitations in West Bengal were sidelined in the national discourse and in its focus
on  the  spectacular  mobilizations  and  displays  of  state  violence  in  Delhi  and  Uttar
Pradesh. However, the importance of East India and of West Bengal in the context of
the citizenship mobilizations cannot be overstated. Firstly, the demands for an NRC and
various constitutional amendments to Indian citizenship are closely intertwined with
the  history  of  Assamese-Bengali  relations.  The  1951  NRC  in  Assam  and  the  1987
Amendment to the 1955 Citizenship Act were, among other things, intended to disown
and expel the Bengali population in Assam where it had begun to settle during the
1800s in a position of relative dominance. The 1987 CAA in particular, which was passed
in the wake of the Assam Accord, reflected a desire of both the union government and
of Assamese nationalists to curtail the influx of refugees from East Pakistan and then
Bangladesh, who mere mainly Bengalis and who predominantly moved into Assam and
West Bengal. The Supreme Court passed a verdict to renew the 1951 NRC in 2014 with
the ostensible goal of identifying “illegal immigrants” and “non-citizens” in reference
to Bengali speakers. This is enmeshed with other complex ethnolinguistic, communal,
and caste-based politics  in  Assam to  which this  article  does  not  further  attend for
reasons  of  space. Instead,  the  focus  of  this  contribution lies  solely  on West  Bengal
where I conducted 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork from October 2018 to February
2020. In fact, the second reason for the importance of the East, in this case Bengal, to
the NRC-CAA nexus lies in the fact that Bengal was the only other British province to be
partitioned along religious lines. Unlike in Punjab, however, the population transfer
was  partial  and  Bengali  Muslims  constituted  27  percent  of  the  population  of  West
Bengal in the 2011 census. While the wounds of the eastern Partition are less deep than
in  western  India,  they  have  largely  remained  socially  and  politically  unaddressed,
including among the higher caste Hindus who came from East Bengal in the 1940s and
1950s, and the largely lower caste Hindus who came in the 1970s and thereafter. This is
the situation the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been seeking to exploit through the
NRC, CAA, and the NPR census in West Bengal.
3 In fact, BJP has long been keen to capture West Bengal, India’s fourth-most populous
state  and  one  that  has  largely  kept  out  national  parties  since  the  1960s.3 Its  two-
pronged  strategy  in  this  regard  involves,  on  the  one  hand,  an  anti-incumbency
discourse focusing on poor governance by the ruling Trinamool Congress party around
issues of corruption; economic development; law and order; terrorism; and a supposed
politics  of  “Muslim  favouritism.”  On  the  other  hand,  its  emphasis on  communal
polarization to consolidate Hindu electoral support in a post-Partition electorate has
been its more active campaign strategy. In recent years, the BJP intensified a discourse
around  Bengali  Muslims,  whether  Indian  or  Bangladeshi,  as  “illegal  immigrants”
(oboidho obhibashi) and “infiltrators” (onuprobeshkari) and have spoken of the expulsion
of internal national enemies from the nation. The state has witnessed an increase in
communal  riots  since  the  expansion  of  BJP  party  offices,  RSS  shakhas,  and  other
establishments of the Sangh Parivar from 16 riot-like conflicts in 2014 (GOI 2017:3) to
58 in 2017 (GOI 2018:3). In December 2018 and January 2019, the Home Minister and BJP
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president, Amit Shah, attempted to conduct large a “chariot procession” for Lord Rama
(ram rath yatra) through West Bengal leading up to the 2019 General Elections, in the
style of the 1990s yatra to Ayodhya. For two weeks,  three simultaneous processions
were supposed to move through hundreds of villages before converging on Kolkata.
Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress ground them down through the state courts, as
well as through her mobilizational capacities,  and thus prevented the yatra and the
communal violence it was feared to produce. The BJP nonetheless won 20 out of 42
parliamentary seats in West Bengal during the 2019 General Election. 
4 Much of the agitation surrounding the NRC-CAA-NPR in Bengal must therefore also be
seen  in  the  context  of  electoral  politics,  and  in  particular  the  2021  West  Bengal
Legislative Assembly election. A BJP victory in one of the country’s largest states, and
one  in  which  until  before  the  2019  General  Election  it  had  had  minimal  electoral
support, would of course have important implications for the direction of politics at the
national level. More specifically, however, the 2021 election is also widely considered to
be the litmus test for the survival of the TMC party as well as for the nature of dissident
politics  in  the  state  from  leftist  to  feminist,  queer,  or  other  minority  assertions
(including those at  the intersections of  these).  Even if  some of these are subject to
histories of passive and active repression by the state government including occasional
physical violence, the relationship between them has largely been agonistic rather than
antagonistic  (cf.  Mouffe  2000:102  f.).  Thus,  in  spite  of  the  seemingly  cynical  power
politics around electoral parties and governance, there remains a certain secular and
democratic consensus between otherwise opposed actors in West Bengal, a decorum in
which BJP is seen not to partake and which it is expected to obliterate should it take
over  the  state  government  in  2021.  In  fact,  the  remainder  of  this  article  is  an
illustration of the presence and workings of this consensus.
5 The NRC-specific activist engagement in West Bengal may well have been the first in
India outside of Assam, beginning in mid-2018 and experiencing a consolidation and
expansion in the second half of 2019. The movement that emerged over this period was
ultimately  successful  in  pressuring  the  TMC-led  West  Bengal  government  into
abandoning preparations for the NPR census,  which forms the fundamental  step in
preventing the creation of the NRC. In fact, while being clear on its opposition to the
CAB/CAA4 and then the NRC, the TMC leadership had promoted a self-contradictory
position on the NPR in which it variously dismissed it as irrelevant or objectionable
while nonetheless insisting it would conduct the census on which the NPR builds and
from which the NRC would be drawn.5 Accordingly, the first detention centers were
already under construction in West Bengal in late 2019 when the mobilizations were
picking up strength. It was not until March 2020, under intense pressure from a newly
created public on the streets and in an increasingly unified media discourse around the
shared  rejection  of  the  NRC-CAA-NPR,  a  public  that  was  the  direct  result  of  the
dynamics set  into motion by the mobilizations,  that the state government formally
committed to halting the census preparations in its jurisdiction. 
6 This article, then, is an attempt to broadly retrace these dynamics. It is based on the
Geertzian method of a “deep hanging out”—daily observation without participation—of
the movement, which in turn is embedded in 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork on
some of the activist organizations that initiated and remained central political actors at
different levels of this movement.6 I was thus able to follow around and observe their
mobilizational efforts first-hand and up close from October 2018 to February 2020. In
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particular,  I  focus  on a  left-wing political  platform called Young Bengal,  which co-
founded a larger, issue-based platform in the state by the name of Joint Forum Against
NRC (nagorik ponji biroddhi juktomoncho). Even though the Joint Forum largely lost its
leadership position within the mobilization once the movement was taken over by the
incommensurably  more  powerful  TMC-led  West  Bengal  government,  a  complex
dynamic  the  activists  had helped create  ultimately  forced the  state  government  to
adopt and promote the Joint Forum’s core demands as the government’s own. 
7 The following sections of this paper retrace the trajectory of this activist organization
across  changing  contexts,  and  the  gradual  increase  in  its  ability  to  shape  these
contexts. Although the political platform spearheading this movement had at its core
two  non-parliamentary  left  organizations,  it  achieved  its  transformational  effects
precisely  within  and  because  of  the  electoral  context  of  the  looming  Legislative
Assembly elections of 2021—and because of its normative dimensions. 
 
The CAB Phase in West Bengal (August 2018 to
December 2019)
8 The earliest agitation against the NRC began in West Bengal in August 2018 with the
first publication of the list in Assam. At the time, it was seen by the organizers of the
protest as merely an anti-Bengali move confined to the state of Assam, although they
quickly surmised then that the NRC was going to be used as a polarizing device by BJP
in  the  2019  national  election.  Their  framing  of  the  issues  and  how  they  connect
developed gradually,  mainly due to the intense legal and historical research by key
organizers, and they were to my knowledge the first in the country to connect the NRC
to the CAB and thus to a wide set of issues surrounding citizenship and communal
categorization. The organization that initiated the movement in question here is Young
Bengal, a non-parliamentary leftist political platform made up largely of urban middle
class,  largely  higher  caste  Hindus  in  Kolkata,  although there  are  also  a  number  of
Muslims—communist and non-communist sympathizers—among their members. They
held public conventions and outreach programs (procharer progrem, shobha, onusthan)
throughout the year until they formed the Joint Forum Against NRC in October 2019, a
loose alliance of 26 organizations that is jointly coordinated by conveners of a core of
twelve organizations. These either feature a largely Muslim membership across a wide
spectrum of political, social, and cultural concerns; or they largely consist of Hindus, in
which case they are invariably of leftist orientation.7
9 Over a period of 24 days beginning on November 15, 2019, the Joint Forum carried out
an awareness raising campaign or yatra by bus through 60 locations across the entire
state of West Bengal. The anchor points of the yatra were public outreach programs on
street  corners,  markets,  play fields,  and in town halls.  The campaign began with a
grand opening in Siliguri at the foot of the Himalayas and wound its way south through
villages, towns, and highway stations, touching the north-eastern fringes of Kolkata
and moving on to the border with Bangladesh before heading around the capital in a
clockwise motion through Bhangar and all the way to Bakkhali on the Bay of Bengal.
From there, it moved back north, passing through towns and villages to the West of
Kolkata, finally entering Howrah and making its way to Uttarpara in the north. The
yatra culminated in a mass rally in Esplanade in central Kolkata on December 9. There
were between fifteen and fifty activists on the move at any one time, the majority of
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them communist Hindu students or youth activists in their twenties and thirties, along
with  more  seasoned  political  figures  in  their  thirties  and  forties.  Politicians,  local
political  workers,  and assorted  businessmen with  varying political  connections  and
interests would join for a day or two in their wider area. 
10 Two main considerations that are of relevance to our purposes here had guided the
composition of the itinerary. The first was to reach out to and test the responses of a
diverse  demographic  cross-section  of  the  society  in  the  state—Hindu  and  Muslim,
upper and lower caste, East or West Bengali, and with or without a history of communal
conflict.  To  grossly  simplify  my  personal  observations  from  accompanying  the
campaign as an ethnographer, audiences in Muslim localities tended to reach into the
hundreds,  listened  attentively,  and  expressed  strong  support  for  a  resistance
movement  through  idioms  of  either  fear  or  playful  defiance,  including  in  casual
conversations I had with bystanders. Audiences in Hindu majority areas (irrespective of
caste), on the other hand, rarely exceeded one or two dozen bystanders and it was not
uncommon for a program to have attracted fewer than ten members of the public over
the course of one or two hours. In fact, those who stopped to listen often left after a few
minutes.  The second consideration was to expand or reinforce existing networks in
these areas across the state, as both the Joint Forum and its yatra relied on the support
of local political, social, or cultural organizations. In fact, the mobilizational effects of
the  yatra largely  lay  in  consolidating  and  energizing  the  existing  network  of
organizations  across  the  state,  especially  through  the  personal  bonds  forged  and
cultivated by working together and carrying out  a  public  program. Thus,  the 2,400
persons who reportedly attended the grand finale of the yatra, the mass rally in Kolkata
on the eve of the passing of the CAB, were not loose members of the public who had
been activated by a speech or leaflet. Rather, they were largely members of already
participating or affiliated organizations who otherwise may not have been galvanized.
This was evident from the manner in which they arrived at the venue by organizational
grouping, and organizers themselves later shared as much with me.
11 With the passing of the CAA the following day, it was precisely in the areas in which the
Joint  Forum had invested most  heavily  through a higher number of  programs,  and
where  local  organizations  had  been  the  strongest,  that  the  protests  erupted  most
forcefully. This is not to suggest that the Joint Forum programs per se effected these
mobilizations through public outreach, pace some of the organizers’ claims. In fact, the
central paradox of the yatra lies in the fact that it attracted very limited crowds and
little  to no media attention.  It  also hardly raised any money—just  enough to cover
expenses—and the “manpower” of any participating party was negligible especially in
comparison  to  the  massive  mobilizational  capacities  of  Trinamool  or  even  the
Communist Party of India (Marxist). Nevertheless, the yatra formed a major link in the
chain of maneuvers through which the Joint Forum effected a transformation of the
political landscape in West Bengal.
12 It  is at this point that I  would advance the proposition that the work the yatra did
occurred on a different plane. The campaign and its programs, although often poorly
attended and of limited affective import, effected a moral intervention into a symbolic
political  space that was shared by most political  forces in the anti-BJP oppositional
spectrum including the TMC-led state government. It was the mere fact that the Joint
Forum had been the first to raise alarm over a large issue, and set a moral precedent
with their yatra, that spawned copy-cat movements among both the Hindu leftist and
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the Muslim political spectrum. Thus the Left Front opposition, various small parties
and  newly  formed  independent  factions,  such  as  the  NO  NRC  Movement  and  the
Solidarity Forum, initiated their own anti-NRC mobilizations in order to lay claim to
the oppositional space declared and instantiated by the agitation of the Joint Forum.
This prompted TMC to launch their own agitation and claim leadership over the anti-
NRC-CAB  space  as  the  issue  consequently  rose  to  prominence  in  the  state’s  public
discourse, including in the media and in parliament. 
13 What emerged from this,  I  would argue,  was a sense of  a  moral  public,  a  veritable
citizenry, around the shared rejection of the NRC, CAB/CAA, and later the NPR. It is
perhaps not unironic that citizenship protests should instantiate citizenship in a civic
republican sense: as a practice of dissent and deliberation within a common moral-
epistemological framework. I  render this aspect the central point of interest of this
contribution  because  all  participating  political  forces  became  answerable  to  the
imagined gaze  of  this  moral  community,  no  matter  how disparate  their  goals  may
otherwise  have  been.  The  visibility  of  this  new  public  was  enhanced  through  the
spectacular displays of dissent, such as state-wide protests and the burnings of trains
and central buses in the days and weeks after the CAB was passed into law. This is the
dynamic that re-emerged during the CAA-phase of the movement and which is key to
understanding the developments to which the final section of this contribution attends.
 
The CAA Phase in Kolkata: Park Circus Maidan
14 The first weeks after the CAA was passed into law were marked by civil unrest across
the state, with trains and buses—symbols of the Center and thus the Government of
India—blocked, pelted, and set on fire, and copies of the CAA burned along with BJP
paraphernalia  and  effigies  of  BJP leaders.  Large  numbers  of  AIMIM8 leaders  and
activists  were  arrested  although  the  protests  were  carried  by  a  wide  spectrum  of
organizations including TMC, as well as by popular spontaneity. The protest rallies in
Kolkata  over  the  subsequent  weeks  were  mixed  and  included  many  first-time
protesters from across the middle classes as well as a great diversity of organizations
across the political spectrum, from TMC-affiliated programs to leftist student groups
from Jadavpur,  Presidency,  and Calcutta Universities among others.  Liberal  and left
feminist and queer rights groups held marches and other programs, including a large
“Trans,  Queer,  Women’s  March  against  NRC-CAA-NPR.”  The  Kolkata  Rainbow Pride
Walk on December 29, 2019, focused strongly on this issue, including on the violence
against students and Muslims in Delhi and elsewhere. The agitations had accrued such
numbers and force that when the Prime Minister visited Kolkata on January 11, 2020,
he could not be driven into the city and was instead forced to fly in from the airport by
helicopter—a  historic  repeat  of  the  massive  left-wing  protests  against  the  war  in
Vietnam that forced Robert McNamara to do the same upon his visit in 1968. By the
time  the  yatra had  concluded  a  month  earlier,  the  CAB/CAA  and  NRC  had  been
connected to a host of social issues, vulnerabilities, and marginalities and had drawn in
a wide range of activist and non-activist forces that often no longer had any connection
to the Joint Forum. 
15 Once the Shaheen Bagh protest became known, various organizers rushed to be the
first to launch a sit-in (dharna) in Park Circus, a Muslim-majority area in the heart of
Kolkata  that  is  considered  a  center  of  Muslim  political  life.  Young  leftist  feminist
The Agonistic Struggle between Trinamool Congress and a Non-partisan Protest ...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
6
activists from Jadavpur University (JU) in Kolkata were in talks with senior Muslim
organizers from the area in early January, when they were beaten to the race by a
middle aged lady from the area who runs a local NGO. In the initial days, she sat with
her relatives under the pavilion on the meadow next to the Park Circus Maidan Mosque
on the seven-point crossing at the northern edge of the Park Circus area. With each
day, the number of people swelled, especially after work hours, and the crowd reached
hundreds and then thousands in less than a week. In contrast to the largely Bengali-
speaking mobilizations during the CAB phase and after, most of the participants here
were Urdu speakers of varying class backgrounds and came from the area as well as
from other working class Muslim neighborhoods such as Metiabruz, Garden Reach, and
Topsia.9 However, the early stage of the sit-in attracted a wide variety of supporters
and organizers,  from artists,  actors,  queer  activists,  communists,  Bengali  and Urdu
speakers,  journalists,  students and pupils,  and of  course the police and intelligence
branches. 
16 Park Circus consciously reproduced the female-centered political aesthetic of Shaheen
Bagh, with women and girls sitting in the middle and a crowd made up largely of men
standing around them, the imaginary line of separation soon reaffirmed by a plastic
rope a few days later. This spatial arrangement carried its own moral commitment to
which all political forces had to adhere—there was an understanding among all actors
that Muslim women were to remain the center and the face of the movement from then
on,  irrespective of  the nature and the result  of  the inevitable  struggles  for  control
behind  the  scenes.  The  associations with  a  politics  of  respectability  and  male
guardianship  reproduced  images  of  female  domesticity  as  indicators  of  Muslim
conservatism among several of the communist and feminist student activists of Hindu
background. This was further compounded by the fact that many of the women and
children  were  brought  there  by  their  male  relatives,  affines,  or  organizers  on
motorbikes and trucks, and would quickly find their place within the “women-only”
section.  Some of  the activists  from Joint  Forum and other left  wing feminist  youth
activists  from  Hindu  families  displayed  a  complex  sense  of  estrangement  and
discomfort with this while cultivating and expressing a cultural or social  relativism
toward what they perceived to be “traditional” gender roles of a socioeconomically
oppressed demographic category. At the same time, they often preemptively reflected
on Islamophobic stereotyping and used the occasion to reiterate that patriarchy and
capitalism produced very similar social arrangements among Hindus. In fact, women
had largely been either absent from or been a minority in the mobilizations during the
CAB phase, be it as speakers, organizers, or audience members. It was only when the
agitations  became  popular  after  the  passing  of  the  bill  that  women,  including  as 
women,  became prominent  voices  in  and of  the protest  movement.  The active  and
visible  participation of  Muslim women in  a  political  movement  of  this  sort  seemed
unprecedented, at least to many Hindu activists, and thus became a source of pride and
inspiration to them. 
17 Further, the spatial configuration at Park Circus Maidan instantiated a new gendered
division of labor as women activists from the largely Hindu communist organizations,
but not the men, could effectively traverse the boundaries and socialize with both the
women  at  the  center  and  the  men  in  the  committees.  Even  after  accounting  for
gendered differences in idioms of friendship and affection, it was the women who in my
impression were the ones to form the strongest personal bonds in a relatively short
time, and effectively (and affectively) practiced the politics of cosmopolitan solidarity
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asserted at the explicit symbolic level throughout the movement (see below). There is
of course more to all this than the scope of this article affords, but one final point on
the spatial set-up is noteworthy. One of the recurring observations campaigners shared
with me and among themselves was that it was precisely the fact that women were
constantly inside the sit-in that they failed to participate in the decision making in the
committees at the fringes, which had been set up early to deal respectively with food,
security,  and  guest  speakers,  among  other  things.  Their  gender  composition  was
roughly  equal  in  theory,  but  in  practice  the  men  ended  up  making  most  of  the
decisions. This was less by intention and more by a structural effect not uncommon to
other, similar modes of protest such as hunger strikes in which a leader on hunger
strike is effectively incapacitated from making most decisions.
18 The women themselves, however, largely spoke of their participation in terms of the
political issues at hand—the rejection of the NRC and CAA—and positioned themselves
and the wider movement as the custodians of the constitution, of the secular character
of  the  country  enshrined  therein,  and  of  communal  harmony.  Women  and  men
frequently articulated feelings of integration with the nation, and there was a strong
sense  that  the  entire  country  was  protesting  alongside  them  and  that  only  active
members of the Hindu right-wing were not. The sentiments expressed were of defiance,
enjoyment, and excitement especially as the numbers swelled and the maidan filled up.
The discourse that emerged from conversations, interviews, speeches, slogans, as well
as statements and symbols on posters, banners, and paraphernalia projected a strongly
unifying  picture  of  national  belonging.  The  constitutionalist  and openly  nationalist
assertions drew on a repertoire of elements common to other minority mobilizations in
India and foregrounded Ambedkar and other prominent historical  figures  from the
independence  movement  such  as  Bhagat  Singh,  Tagore,  Subhas  Chandra  Bose,  and
Mahatma Gandhi. Early on, first one and then several banners declared this to be a
second Independence Movement (Park Circus Dharna—Swadhinata Andolan 2.0) and over
the  days,  several  protesters  would  point  out  that  India  had  been part  of  the  fight
against fascist Germany and that it was now fighting fascism and concentration camps
here. Parallels were repeatedly drawn between the BJP and Nazism or fascism; Modi
and Hitler; and German concentration camps and the NRC detention camps; parallels
that ultimately served to reaffirm the movement’s location within a history of Indian
nationality and nationalism.
19 Various participants and organizers from Muslim backgrounds stressed that this was
not to be seen as a “Muslim movement,” and some even went so far as to claim that the
CAA  was  “not  against  Muslims  but  against  Indians,”  foregrounding  their  own
Indianness and their allegiance to the nation through emphasis on the constitution and
their  own citizenship.  While the absence of  a  minoritarian language is  in line with
previous  local  assertions  in  Park  Circus  (e.g.,  Chatterjee  2017:106–8)  as  well  as  the
simultaneous anti-CAA mobilizations in Delhi (e.g., Martelli and Garalytė 2019:8), it did
also  relate  to  a  concern  about  potential  fracturing  of  the  movement  due  to  the
intervention of political parties. 
20 In  fact,  this  concern  about  fracturing  was  reflected  in  another  prominent  set  of
discursive elements emphasizing that the movement be “not political” and calling on
political parties not to pursue their own politics in the maidan. Even representatives of
established political parties had been barred from speaking at the sit-in by the Guest
Committee of the movement,  most notably perhaps a senior leader of the Congress
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party and former Union Finance Minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram. Soon, posters at
the entrance to the maidan proclaimed: “Welcome to Park Circus Swadhinta Andolon 2.0
Kindly Keep Your Religion, Religious Affiliation and Banner Outside the Gate,” and to cite but
one example, the speech in Urduized Hindustani by a young Muslim woman ended in
the following words and exchange of chants: 
“So, please do not create differences, don’t spread false rumors, don’t post
wrong [information] on Facebook. We object to this, there is no party banner
here. We’re all Indians, the tricolor is fluttering here, and we are Indians. We
are  not  related  to  any party.  Here  our… the  tricolor  is  our  banner,  and,
insha’Allah shall be the shroud of every Indian in this country.”
“Insha’Allah!”
“Long live the revolution!” 
“Long live! Long live!”10
National flags were thus also used to emphasize the non-partisan character that was
claimed in order to avert concerns over political infighting. However, there were two
further reasons for this. One is that it also reflected public cynicism about party politics
widely shared in other parts of South Asia. However, and more specifically, the anti-
partisan discourse was promoted forcefully by those factions within the movement that
were opposed to a Trinamool influence. Although they were unsuccessful in keeping
the party at bay, and although this discourse had itself ended up concealing the TMC
intervention behind a veneer of non-partisanship, its normative force did survive into
the  phase  after  the  TMC  had  taken  leadership  over  the  space—and  remained
accountable to the non-partisan aesthetic.
 
The politics of patronage and fragmentation 
21 Throughout  the  movement,  there  were  small  groups  of  activists  and  organizers
scattered  across  the  maidan,  moving  from  one  little  group  to  the  next,  discreetly
sharing  and  discussing  developments  and  liaising  with  other  small  groups  while
slogans,  chants,  and speeches  given from within  the  women’s  section continuously
resounded  through  the  space.  This  section  tends  to  the  political  tensions  and
maneuvers behind the scenes that ultimately led to the capture of the Park Circus sit-in
by the Trinamool  Congress  party and its  allies.  Within a  few days,  the Park Circus
dharna had become the perceived center of the movement against CAA-NRC-NPR in
West  Bengal.  There  are  often references  to  internal  rivalries  in  the  scholarship  on
protest  movements  which  are  left  unexamined.  They  are  significant  here  not  only
because  they  show  how  the  state  government  captured  an  otherwise  oppositional
movement,  but  also  because  they  demonstrate  the  compelling  force  of  the  moral
category of a dissident citizenry that had emerged discursively through symbolism and
rituals of integration and community making, so that even though the largest political
party assumed leadership over the movement, it was compelled to adapt its line to the
discourse of the movement rather than the other way around. To grossly simplify in
the interest of space but also of anonymity, one camp was aligned with and the other
opposed  to  TMC.  In  the  former,  TMC  operated through  a  certain  larger  non-
parliamentary Muslim organization as well as a group of businessmen and a small, rival
splinter group of left wing activists; the latter consisted of other Muslim organizations
and businessmen as well as a spectrum of the Kolkata left, including leftist activists of
Hindu background. The Joint Forum was informally close to this second camp and some
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of its members were in the committees, but it was not part of the organizing circles in
any formal manner. 
22 The  tensions between  these  camps  became  visible  in  the  committees,  in  indirect
remarks during public speeches, and through a politics of suspicion surrounding state
patronage and female Muslim agency. They concluded in the capture of the movement
by Trinamool Congress through a strategy of state-based patronage, akin to a permit raj,
in which it  first withheld or rather delayed permission for the formalization of the
protest while identifying, from within the organizers’ circles, those willing to establish
a  link  to  the  state  government  and  municipal  corporation.  In  hindsight,  TMC  had
waited with its capacity for sponsorship just long enough to ascertain itself of its allies
within,  destabilize  the  assemblage  of  organizers  internally,  and  to  demonstrate  its
superior capacity to lead this movement from being an internal oppositional force to
becoming established at  a  state-wide and mainstream normative level.  Accordingly,
suspicions emerged in the non-TMC camp that some key organizers may have joined
the movement in order to position themselves as intermediaries in order to establish
rapport  to  the  state  for  their  own  benefit,  or  to  accumulate  enough  visibility,
credibility,  and  connections  to  run  for  the  office  of  ward  councilor  in  the  Kolkata
Municipal Corporation elections that were to be held a few months later (and which, as
of the time of writing, remain postponed due to the COVID lockdown).
23 As a sign of their confidence and of the decisiveness of TMC, some of the key organizers
from the first camp began taking actions on behalf of the movement without consulting
with the others. Most notably, a bit over a week into the sit-in they went to meet Chief
Minister Mamata Banerjee without the knowledge of many of the other organizers. As
part of the negotiation behind closed doors, campaigners later confirmed that the Chief
Minister  not  only  granted  permission  and  thus  the  formalization  of  the  sit-in  but
pledged her support for it. In exchange, it was reported, Mamata Banerjee demanded
the  movement  be  cleansed  of “Naxalite”  and  “SIMI”11 elements  who  were  already
entrenched, a direct if  inaccurate reference to the communist activists and some of
their Muslim allies. 
24 Shortly thereafter, the protest venue transformed visibly. The maidan was showered
with materials such as a tent which ever expanded over the subsequent days; plastic
planes  to  sit  on;  portable  toilet  cabins;  floodlights;  and  a  sound  system with
microphones and loudspeakers across the maidan. Space and crowd management were
formalized with the introduction of physical crowd dividers to regulate the direction of
the flow of bodies, aided by ushers in printed t-shirts with standardized “volunteer”
badges.  An  abundance  of  food  packages  intensified  relations  of  generosity  and
hospitality within the movement, as well as a soft patronage as some of those who were
“faces”  of  the  movement  or  acted  clearly  as  organizers  were  also  able  to  visibly
distribute them to families asking to be fed. In a similar vein, organizers reported a
sharp increase in cash funding that could no longer be accounted for by private and
small  organizational  donations.  Activists  from  the  non-TMC  camp  voiced  their
exasperation at the confident visibility of the takeover through sponsorship, such as in
the absence of donation boxes which otherwise could have communicated a pretense
that  the  sit-in  was  not  being  “bought”  and  “flooded”  by the  state  government.
Simultaneously,  a  prominent  TMC  MLA  was  allowed  to  give  a  speech  after
representatives  from  other  parties  had  hitherto  been  barred  from  speaking.  The
subsequent day, two TMC councilors from adjacent wards came with their men and
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delivered speeches that did not engage with the NRC and CAA, but instead praised the
Chief Minister. They reaffirmed the claim that the protesters could have come to them
five days earlier and that they would have gladly arranged for their demands to be met.
25 Non-TMC aligned activists, Hindu, and Muslim alike, voiced deep disenchantment and
disappointment and a sense of betrayal—and women activists more forcefully so than
men, for reasons outlined above. The overall atmosphere on the maidan, by contrast,
became all  the  more  festive  and  celebrative  as  the  movement  was  seen  to  receive
mainstream endorsement through the state. Crowds of dozens, sometimes hundreds,
flocked into the maidan chanting slogans, singing the national anthem, and waving the
national flag. Two to three thousand people were present at a time during the days
following the government capture, filling out almost the entire maidan around the sit-
in.  While  it  is  true that  the Trinamool  party  and state  administration activated its
structured as well as unstructured, non-organizational mobilizational networks,12 Park
Circus Maidan developed its own attracting force. Families came with their children
after school and work hours, groups of youngsters and children marched in, and men
and women dressed up more and the latter used more make-up than during the first
week. It was the place to be, or, as a fellow anthropologist friend remarked, it became
like a mela, a fair. Many ordinary protesters from Muslim backgrounds continued to
frame their participation in terms of the political issue, while simultaneously giving
voice to a euphoric intensification of the experience of citizenship through a sense of
integration with the nation around a shared rejection, in a vernacular constitutionalist
idiom, of the CAA, NRC, and NPR. For many, the expansion and state uptake seemed to
underline  the  sense  that  the  entire  country  was  on  their  side.  It  became  both  a
celebration and a protest, and subsequently a place for various oppositional politicians
from across India to come and speak as the guests of the movement’s joint leadership—
that is, the West Bengal government and the local founders of the dharna.
26 With the state government takeover, the diversity of the Park Circus Maidan movement
bled away within a few days as the left, feminist, queer, and other circles withdrew and
the  dharna became  entirely  Hindustani  speaking.  Activists  with  the  Joint  Forum
withdrew as well and opened a counter-center to pressure TMC from within their own
space. For this purpose, they organized a rally of reportedly 13,000 people on January
21, the day the Supreme Court verdict refused to stay the CAA, and converted the rally
into  a  sit-in  next  to  the  Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation  Building  in  Dharmatala,  a
predominantly  Muslim  area  in  central  Kolkata.  The  demographic  and  spatial
composition was similar to Park Circus Maidan, in that women were seated on carpets
on the street in a section separated from the men by physical barriers. This dharna, 
however, was placed directly on the street and always remained smaller in size. Unlike
Park Circus, the women’s section constantly faced onto the side of the stage, which was
instead directed toward the men’s section, thereby rendering the spatial aesthetic less
centered on women. During the first week, this arrangement paid little more than lip
service to the supposed centrality of Muslim women to the movement, and nearly all
speakers were men. However, the Joint Forum kept the program open to anyone who
shared the minimum common understanding and thus re-created a non-TMC political
space. With time, as the dharna became known locally and was promoted through the
organizers’ networks, the number of women on stage increased and the composition of
speakers and performers diversified. 
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27 Yet, it never managed to attract the feminist and queer sectors of the Kolkata activist
scene who had initially participated in Park Circus. The reasons for this are complex
and can only be enumerated partially and synoptically. The sit-in was seen to be run by
male-dominated  organizations  without  feminist  credentials  which,  after  the
disappointing  experience  of  Park  Circus,  rendered  it  all  the  more  uninteresting.
Furthermore, Park Circus had started out as a space of multiple possibilities, and that
competitive openness also meant that the presence of rival organizations diversified it.
The New Market dharna,  in contrast,  was clearly launched by the Joint  Forum, and
organizations  with  a  history  of  acrimonious  rivalry  with  those  participating  in  the
Forum stayed away. However, New Market did develop its own openness, as a matter of
policy but also in that an ever expanding network of other organizations, activists, and
other individuals without a history of  bitter rivalry or antipathy joined—from local
residents,  pupils,  and  students  to  poets,  actors,  musicians,  business  persons,  and
political figures from across the country. And yet, New Market seldomly achieved the
affective intensity of Park Circus, which remained the visible center of the anti-NRC-
CAA-NPR movement in West Bengal.13 
28 New Market,  although not the center of the movement,  quickly came to define the
ideological  line  of  the  movement  in  Bengal  again.  This  was  partly  through  their
openness and wide network across the state; partly by having continuously been the
first  to  define  and  shape  the  agenda  since  October  2019;  and  partly  through their
member in parliament and allies in the news media. Their continuous insistence on the
NPR census as the key device through which the NRC would be created and the CAA
rendered  meaningful  came  to  dominate  the  public  discourse,  and  changes  in  the
understanding of the issue would first be articulated in New Market and then find their
way  to  Park  Circus  and  other  dharnas in  Kolkata.  While  Park  Circus  became  a
celebratory environment, it ceased to set the line of the movement. Instead, it was the
core demands articulated since November and set in New Market by Joint Forum and its
allies that dominated the overall movement even if it remained relatively unknown by
name among the wider population.  In fact,  it  had even had limited traction among
activist women in Kolkata beyond the female members of participating organizations,
and the Muslim women at the sit-in had largely joined through the organizers’ kin and
mobilizational networks. However, no political force in Kolkata or West Bengal differed
radically from these demands. Furthermore, the wider alliance around Joint Forum had
transferred its presence not only out of Park Circus Maidan, but also out of Kolkata,
where they were able to draw on and again reinforce and expand their networks from
the previous mobilizational phases. Its activists and allies went into the state districts
to agitate and organize, and exercised further pressure on TMC through its mass base—
that is, the voters and local organizers, who are not part of the daily activities but are
in  some part  connected to  the  party.  In  March 2020,  the  West  Bengal  government
ultimately fully reversed its position on the NPR and instructed its civil servants to
refrain from carrying out the census scheduled to begin in April.
 
Conclusion: Unity, community, and the shift to a
decentered activist modality
29 Previous  scholarship  (e.g.,  Björkman 2014;  Piliavsky 2014;  Kapur  and Vaishnav 2018)
has shown that cash transfers in the contexts of elections do not buy votes but generate
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relationships. Thus, it is moral expectations that alter voting behavior. The point I wish
to emphasize here is that in this case, the relation of patronage imposed an obligation
not  just  on the receiver,  but  also on the giver.  TMC entered into a  relationship of
obligation because they rendered themselves accountable to the discursive perimeters
of the protest movement. TMC’s takeover in itself created a public commitment to the
moral-political  criteria  of  the  movement,  which  were  strongly  influenced  by  Joint
Forum as it continued to set the movement’s agenda from a new location. Crucially,
this agenda included at its core the clear rejection of the NPR census. In fact, even the
big banners at  Park Circus featured rejections of  the NPR from the beginning.  The
competitive uptake of the cause by various oppositional forces along with the constant
projection of unity prevented a symbolic fragmentation of the movement and produced
an imagined moral community to whose gaze all political actors were accountable. This
unity  was  produced  through  the  integration  of  different  actors  with  diverging
strategies,  goals,  and  modes  of  participating,  who  nonetheless  used  the  same
symbolism and partook in a shared normative imaginary.
30 The COVID lockdown in late March 2020 arguably saved the movement in West Bengal
from running into a wall and imploding, while in Delhi the sit-ins ended in disaster.
Mainly,  the  movement’s  ground-level  strength  at  the  time  rested  on  the  state
government’s  endorsement,  and  on  the  fact  that  implementation  of  the  NPR  is
understood to lie with the states and not the center. Thus, if the state government had
not cancelled the NPR in March and if  the census had thus commenced in April  as
scheduled,  the  movement  would  not  have  had  the  capacity  to  actually  boycott  it
effectively since sit-ins as a mode of resistance would not have sufficed. Irrespectively
of whether jurisdiction over the implementation of the NPR can or will be taken away
from the state governments and be given to the center, a BJP victory in West Bengal in
2021 will lead to its implementation with the full force of the state government. In the
meanwhile, it was not clear how long Park Circus could have further sustained itself as
a protest movement when all of its demands had been taken up by the government. In
New Market,  there was confusion and disagreement on which direction to take the
movement  in,  and  on  whether  to  continue  with  a  hunger  strike  they  had  begun.
Supporters of the hunger-strike approach became unsure of where to take it politically,
and  there  was  no  clear  exit  strategy  from  it.  There  were  early  signs  of  a  wider
disintegration that could have led the movement to atrophy in absence of an NPR-NRC
process to boycott. This is ironically due to their own success: the NPR-NRC was not
going to be implemented for at least another year, until and unless BJP comes to power
in 2021. Whatever would have been left  of an organized boycott force by that time
would  further  have  been  on  its  own  and  faced  with  an  antagonistic  rather  than
agonistic adversary. 
31 The impact of the coronavirus pandemic on dissolving the movement fundamentally
changed its mode of organizing in West Bengal in contrast to Delhi – and it bought
organizers time to rethink and regroup. During the yatra in November and December
2019, there had been a strong centralizing tendency: sometimes local committees were
created, but ultimately, they had remained answerable to the Joint Forum which was
headquartered  in  Kolkata.  However,  the  pandemic  shattered  and  scattered  this
arrangement,  and  led  to  autonomous  neighborhood-  and  area-based  modes  of
conducting political and social work which came to the fore during cyclone Amphan in
mid-May 2020. The visibility, credibility, and networks created through the movement,
The Agonistic Struggle between Trinamool Congress and a Non-partisan Protest ...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
13
including the networks created by being pushed out of Park Circus Maidan and the new
bonds between Muslims and leftist  Hindus,  allowed organizers from this alliance to
perform large,  donation-based relief  operations  in  the  wake  of  cyclone  Amphan in
various parts of the state. These could provide a different starting position for a post-
lockdown,  new  mobilizational  politics  that  is  more  decentered  and  possibly  less
susceptible  to  facing  the  same  fate  as  the  decapitated  movement  in  Delhi  and
elsewhere,  where  many  of  its  visible  exponents were  arrested  by  the  authorities.
Should BJP win the 2021 election, it could face a more distributed, more diverse, and
possibly more resilient dissident force in West Bengal. 
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NOTES
1. This research is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and by the Wenner-Gren Foundation. I would
like to further express my gratitude to my friends and interlocutors in India; to the Centre for
Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, which hosted me during fieldwork; and to the editors of this
issue, in particular Nicolas Jaoul who was most helpful in guiding and supporting the writing
process. Any shortcomings are of course my own.
2. These  refer  respectively  to  the  National  Register  of  Citizens  (NRC),  the  Citizenship
(Amendment) Bill (CAB) and Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), and the National Population
Register (NPR). Unless specified by a different date, by CAB I refer to the 2019 bill before it was
signed by the Government of India on December 12, 2019. CAA then refers to the act into which it
was signed and serves also as a demarcation for the phase of the movement after this date. 
3. For the historical connection between Hindutva and Bengal, see for example Chatterjee (1992);
Sarkar  (1999).  However,  after  the communal  consolidations of  the 1930s  and 1940s,  all  large
political parties in West Bengal have historically “transcended,” as Bhattacharya (2009:59) puts
it,  mobilizations based on caste, religion, or ethnicity. That is,  until BJP. As Kanungo’s (2015)
study retraces, BJP first entered West Bengal in the 1980s at the panchayat level. It expanded its
presence across much of the rural areas of the state but it was not until its alliance with Mamata
Banerjee upon her split from Congress in the 1990s that it began to register tangible if limited
electoral successes.  The TMC-BJP alliance won 100 out of 294 assembly segments in the 1998
Assembly election (but BJP won only one seat of the 14 it contested, out of a total of 42). In fact, it
was TMC that helped BJP into Bengal and BJP that helped TMC onto the national stage, with
Mamata joining the NDA government under Vajpayee. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)
used  this  alliance  and  the  NDA  government  to  expand  its  organizational  structure  in  West
Bengal. However, after Mamata’s break from the alliance, BJP failed to win any seats in West
Bengal in either the assembly elections in 2001, 2006, or even in 2011 when the Left Front was
defeated by TMC; nor in the Lok Sabha elections in 2004. It won only one, the Darjeeling Lok
Sabha seat, in the 2009 elections (Kanungo 2015:56). Since the BJP victory in the 2014 Lok Sabha
elections, however, their expansion in West Bengal has been incommensurably accelerated by
their access to capital and the use of IT cells. Simultaneously, other Sangh Parivar organizations
such as Bajrang Dal, Durga Vahini, and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (which has been present in the
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state since the Ayodhya mobilizations) have intensified their muscular assertions of Hindutva
which are associated with an increase in communal violence (e.g. Roy 2017; Nath and Chowdhury
2019). The number of RSS chapters (shakhas) has reportedly grown from 580 in 2011 (e.g., Das
2017) to 1,800 in September 2019 (Bhattacharya 2019).
4. It should be noted that in the early 2000s, Mamata Banerjee, then a Member of Parliament and
in an alliance with BJP, had been a vociferous supporter of expelling “illegal Bangladeshis” by
creating a register of citizens. This became a cause of embarrassment after she reversed her
position as Chief Minister and arguably further decelerated her commitment to a clear position
on the matter in 2019 and 2020.
5. The reasons for this are complex and it must be noted TMC may not necessarily have had
sinister intentions here. Rather, the state government, like many others, may have been unaware
of the connection between the NPR and the NRC until an opposition MLA and a supporter of Joint
Forum,  Ali  Imran Ramz (a.k.a.  Victor)  from Forward Bloc,  was  in  November  2019  invited  to
explain  it  to  the  Chief  Minister  (CM)  based  on  the  understandings  developed  by  activist
researchers.  Consequently,  the  government  agreed  to  halt the  preparations  for  the  NPR but
remained  reluctant  to  cancel the  process  altogether.  The  TMC’s  embarrassment  over  having
passed, as part of the NDA at the time, the 2003 CAA of which the NRC and NPR are a component
may have led them to deny the link to the extent that they were aware of it. In addition, one
might  surmise  that  the  government  of  West  Bengal  wanted to  avoid  the  political  costs  of  a
constitutional crisis that would have been triggered by not implementing a central directive.
This could also, in part, have been pandering to Hindu voters already affected by anti-Muslim
politicization  and  the  anti-incumbency  discourse  of  TMC’s  law-and-order  problem.  It  is
imaginable, although I do not have evidence for this, that the state government may have had
the intention to pressure its bureaucrats to include as many individuals in the NRC as possible so
as to reduce the number of Muslims stripped of their citizenship and thus of their voting rights.
In other words, a census with a limited NRC. Census information, in any case, remains of great
value to the governing.
6. In  light  of  the  developments  in  Delhi  and  elsewhere,  I  have  refrained  from  naming  any
individuals or further organizations in order to blur identifying information.
7. None of these are affiliated with the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI[M]), which had
led the Left Front coalition that governed West Bengal for 34 years until  2011. This is worth
noting because CPI(M) had on several occasions attempted to sabotage the yatra as it became a
contender in the intra-state oppositional space on the issue. However, it also did so because the
increasing  prominence  of  the  issue  in  the  state  caused  the  party  embarrassment:  it  in  fact
supported the NRC in Assam, where it was a popular demand, and claimed to oppose it in Bengal
while  remaining  trapped  in  insecurities  about  how  this  may  be  taken  by  the  increasingly
communalized Hindu electorate.  This  resulted in CPI(M) being generally  marginalized in the
agitations against the NRC-CAA-NPR.
8. All  India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen,  a political party originally from and largely based in
Telangana, but with a growing presence in other states including West Bengal.
9. Many (but by far not all) Muslim inhabitants of Kolkata have transgenerational histories of
migration  from  Uttar  Pradesh  and  other  states.  They  tend  to  speak  Urdu  and  Urduized
Hindustani rather than Bengali, while the vast majority of Muslims outside the city—in particular
rural communities—are Bengali Muslims. There is a complex historical tension in the language
politics among Muslims in Bengal, which is also reflected in class, caste, and cultural differences
around  the  supposed  superior  status  of  Urdu  speakers.  This  is  of  course  complicated  by
additional forms of social segmentation and stratification among both linguistic groups.
10. “Is liye bhed bhau na ki jai, ghalat afwah na phelai jai, ghalat facebook main nahin dali jai. Ham is chiz
se i’tirad karte hain, yahan koi party ka bener nahin hai. Ham sab hindustani hain, yahan tiranga lahra
raha hai, aur ham sab hindustani hain. ham log parti se ta’alluq nahin rakhte. Yahan hamara… ye tiranga
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hamara bener hai aur insha’allah is desh ka har hindustani ka kafan bhi hoga.” / “Inshallah!” / “Inqilab
zindabad!” / “Zindabad, zindabad!”
11. Students’ Islamic Movement of India, a banned organization originally from Uttar Pradesh.
12. As Chatterjee’s (2017: 87 f., 95–98) study of Park Circus elaborates, local party leaders each
command a network of  followers (including subordinate party workers)  through relations of
patronage which, though tied to their official location in the party and city bureaucracy, are
highly personalized. As has also been remarked for neighboring Bangladesh (e.g. Suykens and
Islam  2013),  during  a  party  mobilization  each  level  in  the  hierarchy  contributes  their  own
followers, and followers of followers. In addition to such “official,” structured networks, leaders
are expected to bring their kin and a wider network of other personal relations for whose upkeep
they pay during that day. This is also a competitive display of mobilizational and organizational
capacities in full view of superior officials, such as ward councilors.
13. Its social media presence was also negligible in size compared to Park Circus Maidan, which
was intense. The role of social media in the entire movement is both ambiguous and important,
and I leave aside a more in-depth discussion of the digital space in order to focus on the street-
level politics in this article. However, to attempt a preliminary outline: in addition to facilitating
communication and co-ordination, the roles of social media also ran in parallel to those of the
news media when disseminating information to a public, whether real or imagined. In this sense,
social  media  also  often  embodied  or  facilitated  the  (somewhat  imagined)  “gaze”  for  which
political performances were staged and where they were “recorded” as having executed their
illocutionary functions. Social media is more democratic in this regard than news media because
it is more accessible and less controlled than the latter, which may also serve as a productive
contrast to the scholarly interest in the (largely top-down) capture of social and other media by
Hindutva forces. Activists in Kolkata make heavy use of social media and going to or making it
into the news media (whether small or mainstream) is often considered a “next level” step of
sorts. In contrast, many of especially the older Muslim women at the dharnas reportedly did not
have social media accounts, and TMC was ultimately pressured by engagement on the ground
and not  through social  media.  In  other  words,  its  role  should  not  be  overstated.  This  is  an
underdeveloped area to which I intend to return in later work.
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